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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S PIN: UNTANGLING FREE 
SPEECH REGULATION IN THE COURTROOM† 
Michael Kagan 
ABSTRACT— Recent disputes in Ohio and Nevada about whether lawyers 
should be allowed to wear “Black Lives Matter” pins in open court expose a 
fault line in First Amendment law. Lower courts have generally been 
unsympathetic to lawyers who display political symbols in court. But it 
would go too far suggest that free speech has no relevance in courtrooms. 
This Essay argues for a way to strike a balance. 
 
AUTHOR—B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Michigan 
Law School. The author is Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. In the interest of full disclosure: the 
author of this article consults regularly with the Clark County Public 
Defender on criminal cases. However, the author was not involved in any of 
the cases described and is not expressing the views of anyone other than 
himself. 
 
  
 
 † This Essay was originally published in the Northwestern University Law Review Online on February 
27, 2018. 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 207 (2018), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=http://northwesternlawreview.org/online?page=4&httpsredir=1&article=12
43&context=nulr_online [https://perma.cc/HRQ9-NECF]. 
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I. A FIRST AMENDMENT FAULT LINE 
On a Tuesday morning in September 2016, Erika Ballou, a deputy 
public defender in Clark County, Nevada, appeared with her client for a 
sentencing hearing in a Las Vegas courtroom.1 She wore a black pin on her 
lapel. “Black Lives Matter,” it said.2 District Court Judge Douglas Herndon 
told her to either take it off or hand her case over to another attorney from 
the public defender’s office.3 Ballou refused and asked the judge to instead 
recuse himself from her cases. Her boss, Clark County Public Defender Phil 
Kohn, stood at her side and insisted she should be allowed to wear the pin.4 
A few days earlier, the Las Vegas Police Protective Association, the 
main police union in the city, had written a letter to the chief judge of the 
district court complaining about defense attorneys wearing the pin in court.5 
Judge Herndon, who had been endorsed by the police union during his 
election campaigns,6 said that he was simply asking that attorneys “leave any 
kind of political or opinion protest statements outside the courtroom. . . . 
Wear it in the hallway. Wear it in front of the courthouse.”7 
 
 1 See Ken Ritter, Defense Attorney Sparks ‘Black Lives’ Protest in Vegas Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Sept. 20. 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f0812b206ffa4385ae31da44f05e7281/defense-attorney-
sparks-black-lives-protest-vegas-court [https://perma.cc/5JS2-Q3LS]. A video of the court hearing is 
available. David Ferrara & Wesley Juhl, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Support Swells Among Las Vegas Defense 
Attorneys, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2016, 9:23 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/
news/las-vegas/black-lives-matter-support-swells-among-las-vegas-defense-attorneys 
[https://perma.cc/NWW2-MZMS]. 
 2 Ritter, supra note 1. 
 3 Ferrara & Juhl, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Wesley Juhl & David Ferrara, Controversy Over Defense Lawyer’s Black Lives Matter Pin Delays 
Hearing, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 20, 2016, 11:47 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/
news/las-vegas/controversy-over-defense-lawyer-s-black-lives-matter-pin-delays-hearing 
[https://perma.cc/3PLT-YBUS]. 
 6 See Voter Guide: Douglas W. Herndon, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/voter-guide/candidates/douglas-w-herndon (presenting candidate-
submitted information) [https://perma.cc/R79E-APAS]. 
 7 Ritter, supra note 1. 
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Ms. Ballou insisted that she was acting within her First Amendment 
rights and argued that she was unfairly being treated differently from Clark 
County prosecutors—who wear office-issued lapel pins—and uniformed 
court marshals, who had been allowed to wear black bands commemorating 
police killed in the line of duty.8 Judge Herndon adjourned the sentencing 
hearing. Two days later, they reconvened. Ms. Ballou agreed to remove her 
pin. Instead, she wore a black arm band, and was flanked by nearly two dozen 
colleagues who wore both the arm bands and Black Lives Matter pins.9 
Ms. Ballou was not the first. Earlier in 2016, Ohio defense attorney 
Andrea Burton settled a contempt of court case against her that began when 
she wore a Black Lives Matter pin to court.10 She told journalists that, as part 
of the settlement, she agreed not to wear the pin inside the courtroom on the 
condition that police be prohibited from wearing black bands on their badges 
commemorating slain officers.11 In that case, the judge told a television 
reporter, “[t]here’s a difference between a flag, a pin from your church or the 
Eagles and having a pin that’s on a political issue.”12 
The Black Lives Matter pin cases expose a fault line in First 
Amendment law. The Supreme Court has never fully resolved the question 
of whether speech in court is free speech for First Amendment purposes. The 
Court has found that lawyers may advertise their services to the public, 
subject to reasonable regulation.13 And the Court has found that lawyers 
enjoy constitutional protection for out-of-court political speech critical of the 
legal system.14 But these cases did not deal directly with attorney expression 
in the courtroom. Some lower courts have rejected claims that lawyers’ 
communications in the courtroom enjoy any First Amendment protection at 
all.15 But their reasoning has been muddled, and the judges have been 
divided. It is not clear how they would treat the specific facts that arose in 
Las Vegas. 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 David Ferrara, Lawyers Pack Courtroom in Support of ‘Black Lives Matter’ Movement, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/lawyers-
pack-courtroom-support-black-lives-matter-movement [https://perma.cc/9PB9-Z73L]. 
 10 Associated Press, Las Vegas Lawyers Plan to Defy Judge, Wear Black Lives Matter Pin, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/las-vegas-lawyers-plan-to-defy-
judge-wear-black-lives-matter-pins [https://perma.cc/94C8-YJCC]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Amanda Smith, Atty. Refuses to Remove Black Lives Matter Pin, Taken into Custody, WKBN 
(July 22, 2016, 11:49 AM), http://wkbn.com/2016/07/22/attorney-jailed-for-refusing-to-take-off-black-
lives-matter-button [https://perma.cc/8EVL-4M3W] (including video). 
 13 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
 14 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1032–33 (1991). 
 15 See infra notes 29–64 and accompanying text. 
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In this brief Essay, I outline the reasons why free speech in the 
courtroom remains somewhat uncharted territory in First Amendment law. 
Using the Las Vegas Black Lives Matter pin case as an example, I argue for 
a way to resolve the inherent tension between free speech and the need to 
maintain order and fairness in the court. Under my proposed solution, judges 
would be able to impose certain limitations on courtroom speech but could 
not engage in viewpoint discrimination. Judges should be especially cautious 
about imposing special restrictions on speech that they regard as more 
controversial. Instead, judges who are concerned about extraneous 
expression in their courtrooms need to hew carefully to a neutral approach, 
applicable to controversial symbols as well as seemingly innocuous speech. 
II. THE TROUBLE WITH SPEECH IN THE COURTROOM 
Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court case involving free speech in 
a courthouse is Cohen v. California.16 In that 1971 case, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutional right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear “a jacket 
bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’” in the corridor outside of a courtroom.17 
But while this free expression occurred in a courthouse, it did not force the 
Court to address judges’ authority to restrict speech inside the courtroom. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court refused to treat Mr. Cohen’s case as a question 
of courthouse decorum because he was punished under a broad statute that 
was applicable everywhere in California.18 
The only direct guidance that the Supreme Court has offered about 
courtroom speech came in another case that, like Ms. Ballou’s, originated in 
Las Vegas. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, a 1991 case about lawyer free 
speech, the Supreme Court found that an attorney could not be sanctioned 
for publicly criticizing misconduct within the criminal justice system.19 But 
the lawyer in that case made his critical statements at a press conference a 
few hours after his client was indicted.20 Like Mr. Cohen, he did not make 
the statements in the courtroom. However, the Gentile Court did say, in dicta, 
that “in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to 
 
 16 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 17 Id. at 16 (quoting the decision of the California Court of Appeals, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1969)). 
 18 Id. at 19. 
 19 501 U.S. 1030, 1034–35 (1991) (J. Kennedy, concurring) (“There is no question that speech 
critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the very center of the First Amendment. Nevada seeks 
to punish the dissemination of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct . . . . The judicial 
system, and in particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a democratic state, and the public 
has a legitimate interest in their operations.”). 
 20 Id. at 1033 (J. Kennedy, concurring). 
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‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.”21 The Court also 
held that states may generally restrict lawyer speech in public if there is 
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to a pending adjudication.22 
Therein lies the problem. Does “extremely circumscribed” mean that an 
attorney has no free speech rights in court at all? Or does it mean that a 
careful balance must be struck? 
Other than the brief dicta in Gentile, the Supreme Court has never 
clearly explained how we should think about the courtroom as a context for 
speech. This is a problem because modern free speech law has become 
extensively focused on categorizing the nature of the forum in which speech 
occurs in order to determine if and how government may regulate it.23 The 
Supreme Court has created three main categories of forums for free speech 
purposes: the public forum, the nonpublic forum, and the limited public 
forum, with the most confusion surrounding the “limited public forum.”24 
In very brief terms, free speech rights are at their apex in a traditional 
public forum, of which the National Mall is the ideal type.25 By contrast, the 
government has more latitude to restrict speech in nonpublic fora, including 
on government property.26 An obvious example would be a government 
office building, where public employees are supposed to conduct the regular 
work of government agencies. If protestors enter, say, a veterans’ hospital 
and begin to shout slogans, the First Amendment does not prevent an official 
from ordering them to stop and forcibly removing them if necessary. 
Protestors could of course picket outside on the sidewalk, but they do not 
have a constitutional right to speak inside. This seems to be the logic behind 
Judge Herndon’s statement that the pin could be worn in the hallway or 
outside the courthouse, but not inside the courtroom. 
 
 21 Id. at 1071. 
      22  Id. at 1063.  
 23 See Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 652 
(2010) (“With so much hinging on the label, litigation routinely arises over whether a court should deem 
a particular location a public forum (where only content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are 
allowed) or a nonpublic forum (where a vast array of restrictions are allowed if they are viewpoint neutral 
and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum).” (footnote omitted)); Robert C. Post, Between 
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 
1731–44 (1987) (tracing the development of the Court’s distinction between public and nonpublic fora). 
 24 See Caplan, supra note 22, at 654 (discussing the Court’s shifting use of the term). The taxonomy 
can become more complicated, because a public forum can come in at least two varieties. It can be a 
“traditional public forum,” which has traditionally been held in trust for public use, or it can be a 
“designated public forum” that the government intentionally opens for that purpose even if it is not 
traditionally considered to be a public forum. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015). 
 25 ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 26 See Caplan, supra note 22, at 651. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1250 
Yet, a court is not entirely closed to the public the way some 
government offices are. It might be closer to the third category, the limited 
public forum. The Court has explained that a limited public forum is 
“reserv[ed] . . . for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”27 
Consider, for illustration, a public municipal board meeting. In this context, 
government officials can restrict speech quite a bit, for instance by only 
allowing public comment at a designated time and requiring speakers to limit 
their statements in duration. Such rules are necessary to allow public bodies 
to function. But it would be considerably different if, say, a school board 
only allowed public comment from people who favored a particular bond 
issue or property tax increase. The Supreme Court has addressed this 
problem by holding that in limited public fora, authorities can regulate the 
form and subject matter of speech, but may not discriminate based on 
viewpoint: 
Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to 
address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not 
a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was 
created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to 
a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise 
includible subject.28 
This principle of viewpoint neutrality would seem to support Ballou’s 
argument that if police can wear arm bands commemorating violence against 
police while they are in a courtroom, she ought to be able wear a pin 
protesting violence by police against people of color. 
III. LOWER COURT RESISTANCE 
At least three federal circuits have rejected claims that lawyers’ 
expression in the courtroom enjoys First Amendment protection. Two of 
these cases produced split decisions, and the colorful circumstances of each 
case help illustrate why judges may be troubled by lawyers’ courtroom 
expression. 
A. Berner v. Delahanty 
Of these three cases, one seems especially similar to Erika Ballou’s 
dispute with Judge Herndon because it also involved a button. In Berner v. 
 
 27 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
 28 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citations omitted); 
see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (calling viewpoint discrimination “an egregious form of content 
discrimination” from which the government is forbidden, “even when the limited public forum is one of 
its own creation”). 
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Delahanty, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the case of 
a Maine lawyer, Seth Berner, who in late October 1995 appeared in Judge 
Thomas Delahanty’s courtroom wearing a button opposing an anti-LGBT 
initiative on the Maine ballot.29 His button said, “No on 1—Maine Won’t 
Discriminate.”30 Judge Delahanty told him to remove it because “the 
courtroom is not a political forum.”31 The First Circuit unanimously agreed: 
A courtroom’s very function is to provide a locus in which civil and criminal 
disputes can be adjudicated. . . . 
. . . Emblems of political significance worn by attorneys in the courtroom as a 
means of espousing personal political opinions can reasonably be thought to 
compromise the environment of impartiality and fairness to which every jurist 
aspires. As an officer of the court, a lawyer’s injection of private political 
viewpoints into the courtroom, coupled with the judge’s toleration of such 
conduct, necessarily tarnishes the veneer of political imperviousness that ideally 
should cloak a courtroom, especially when the partisan sentiments are 
completely unrelated to the court’s business.32 
The First Circuit reasoned that a lawyer compromises a courtroom’s 
“cloak” of impartiality by injecting political speech into a proceeding. But is 
the problem that Mr. Berner’s button was “political,” or that it was 
“completely unrelated” to court business? It seems to me that the latter better 
justifies the First Circuit’s decision, and might explain the court’s 
unanimity.33 Telling him to remove the button was arguably little different 
from telling someone in the audience to be quiet, or telling a lawyer to not 
discuss irrelevancies in an argument. 
Despite her case’s superficial similarity to Mr. Berner’s, Ms. Ballou 
advanced three means of differentiating her speech from Mr. Berner’s. She 
told Judge Herndon that her pin was not supporting or opposing a candidate 
on the ballot (nor a ballot measure, for that matter).34 She argued that “Black 
Lives Matter” referred to “an issue about criminal justice.”35 And, most 
importantly, she pointed to the fact that police are permitted to wear 
symbolic bands in court to suggest that her pin was being singled out for its 
particular message.36 In other words, she asserted the judge’s ruling 
amounted to viewpoint discrimination. These are rebuttable points, to be 
 
 29 129 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 26–27. 
 33 Id. at 22. 
 34 See Ritter, supra note 1. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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sure. A lawyer in a sentencing hearing does not necessarily have the latitude 
to raise any issue that can be related in some manner to criminal justice. 
Moreover, even if the content of the speech is permissible, a rule of order 
might require lawyers to make their arguments on the record, rather than 
through visual signs, symbols, and the like. But once a judge allows some 
symbolic visual expression in speech, it becomes much harder to justify 
restricting others. 
B. Zal v. Steppe 
In 1992, a Ninth Circuit panel issued a split decision on a case involving 
Cyrus Zal, an antiabortion lawyer from California. Zal had defied a ban on 
talking about abortion during a trial of a pro-life protestor.37 The trial judge 
ordered Zal to avoid using a list of fifty words and phrases, such as “killing 
centers,” “infanticide,” “fetus,” “abortion,” and “extermination.”38 Zal 
disregarded the banned word list repeatedly, and by the end of the trial the 
judge had cited him for contempt twenty times.39 Zal cited the First 
Amendment in his defense.40 
Two of the three judges on the appellate panel, Judge Jerome Farris and 
Judge Stephen Trott, rejected Zal’s First Amendment challenge outright.41 
They relied on the dicta from Gentile and an older Supreme Court case 
stating that, when a lawyer disagrees with a trial judge’s decision, he may 
preserve the issue for appeal but may not otherwise disrupt the court or resist 
the judge’s authority.42 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge John 
Noonan noted that the Supreme Court had previously struck down a 
contempt citation for inflamed language used by a pro se defendant.43 Judge 
Noonan thought that this meant that trial judges must grant “broad latitude” 
for abusive language in court.44 He wrote that “[i]t would be ironic if the 
Constitution failed to protect its professional defenders—the lawyers—in the 
very forum dedicated to the Constitution’s doctrine.”45 Judge Noonan quoted 
an earlier Ninth Circuit decision where the court of appeals said, “attorneys 
and other trial participants do not lose their constitutional rights at the 
 
 37 Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 926. 
 40 Id. at 927. 
 41 Id.; id. at 930 (Trott, J., concurring). 
 42 Id. at 927–28 (majority opinion) (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); 
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1952)). 
 43 Id. at 935 (Noonan, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part) (citing In re Little, 
404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam)). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 934–35. 
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courthouse door.”46 But despite that broad phraseology, that prior case dealt 
with restrictions on attorneys talking to the media, rather than on speech in 
the courtroom.47 
In response, Judge Trott insisted that the First Amendment did not apply 
at all in courtrooms because they are not public fora.48 He thought that to 
bring the First Amendment into the courtroom would essentially turn judicial 
order into chaos: 
Does a juror have a First Amendment right to speak or to examine witnesses? 
Does a court reporter have a right to editorialize during closing arguments? May 
spectators chafe, chant, and cheer? Could an anti-abortion advocate appear and 
deliver a right-to-life speech to the jury about to deliberate on the charges 
against Zal’s clients? I would think not.49 
Like the First Circuit, Judge Trott worried about extending First 
Amendment protection to courtroom settings. But the dicta in Gentile may 
not go quite to the extreme position that Judge Trott articulated. Gentile 
explicitly states that free speech in the courtroom is “circumscribed,” but it 
does not say it is nonexistent.50 Judge Trott missed the point when he said, 
“[a]lthough courtrooms have always been devoted to debate, they have never 
been devoted to free debate, but only to debate within the confines set by the 
trial judge and the rule of law.”51 The answer is not to dismiss the idea that 
the First Amendment applies to courtrooms, but to focus on how to apply it 
in a way that protects decorum and prevents viewpoint discrimination. 
C. Mezibov v. Allen 
The third relevant court of appeals case involved Marc D. Mezibov, a 
criminal defense attorney in Ohio, and his dispute with a local prosecutor, 
Michael K. Allen.52 During a criminal trial, Mezibov made multiple motions 
to have Allen disqualified from the case, which the trial judge rejected.53 
Mezibov’s client was ultimately convicted, after which Allen told the local 
press that Mezibov “is a man who doesn’t try too many cases and the verdict 
 
 46 Id. at 934 (quoting Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). 
 47 Levine, 764 F.2d at 592. 
 48 Zal, 968 F.2d at 932 (Trott, J., concurring) (“Traditional First Amendment analysis also supports 
the idea that lawyers (and others) have no First Amendment right to speak freely in a courtroom.”). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991). 
 51 Zal, 968 F.2d at 932 (Trott, J., concurring). 
 52 Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 715 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 53 Id. 
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shows that. If I were [the defendant], I would ask for my money back.”54 
Mezibov responded by filing a Section 198355 suit against Allen, alleging 
that he had defamed him under color of law in retaliation for filing motions 
in court.56 In support of his argument that Allen was using the power of the 
state to retaliate against him for protected speech in court, he cited the Ninth 
Circuit’s “courthouse door” line that Judge Noonan also echoed.57 
In Mezibov v. Allen, all three Sixth Circuit judges agreed that Mezibov 
could show no real injury because “a criminal defense attorney of ordinary 
firmness would not have been chilled” by a prosecutor’s public criticism.58 
But they split over the applicability of the First Amendment. Judge Siler and 
Judge Batchelder, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zal, concluded 
that courtrooms are nonpublic forums and that “we regularly countenance 
the application of even viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech.”59 
They cited rules of procedure and evidence banning lawyers from discussing 
irrelevant or prejudicial topics during trial.60 This drew Judge Moore’s 
dissent: 
By stating that the First Amendment has no place in the courtroom, the 
majority . . . betrays the historical role of litigation as providing a forum for the 
expression of core political speech, instead relegating attorney speech to a level 
heretofore occupied only by such speech as obscenity and fighting words. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Far from seeing the courtroom as a place where the First Amendment would 
“intrude,” I view the courtroom as a place where freedom of expression should 
be embraced and exercised with vigor.61 
Judge Moore was right to be alarmed at entirely exempting courtrooms 
from First Amendment protection. Because courts are not stereotypical 
traditional public fora, and because judges clearly must control their 
courtrooms, it is tempting to rule out any place for the First Amendment in 
courtrooms. But this simplistic approach impairs the central role attorneys 
play in our system of government. The American Bar Association says that 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 56 Mezibov, 411 F.3d at 716. 
 57 Id. at 718 (quoting Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). 
 58 Id. at 715; id. at 726 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the 
majority opinion that Allen’s speech would not “deter a criminal defense attorney of ordinary firmness 
from” advocating for “his or her client”). 
 59 Id. at 718. 
 60 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 11; and FED. R. APP. P. 34, 38). 
 61 Id. at 724, 726 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
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a lawyer is “a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.”62 Echoing this sentiment, the Supreme Court has described the role 
of attorneys in a democracy in grandiose terms: 
One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of after-dinner speeches 
to affirm that all the interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional 
guarantees given to “life, liberty and property” are in the professional keeping 
of lawyers. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s responsibility in our 
society that he stands “as a shield” . . . in defense of right and to ward off 
wrong.63 
Lawyers play a bedrock role in protecting the values written into our 
constitutional form of government. It is entirely foreseeable that if lawyers 
defend right and prevent wrong in our system of justice, they might 
occasionally ruffle a judge’s feathers or express something that seems 
controversial. In those situations, viewpoint neutral First Amendment 
protection for lawyers only strengthens a courtroom’s “veneer of political 
imperviousness.”64 
IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY 
The First Amendment should protect a lawyer’s political speech in a 
courtroom, albeit with considerable restrictions that are necessary for courts 
to perform their adjudicative functions. The best reading of the Supreme 
Court case law in this area sees courts as highly specialized, limited public 
fora. Speech may thus be circumscribed, as the Court said in Gentile, but that 
does not mean that the First Amendment has no place. Speech in court is 
highly regulated by the rules of court procedure, rules of evidence, and the 
need to maintain order and decorum. But it would go too far to say, as some 
lower court judges have, that free speech stops at the courthouse gate.65 By 
way of illustration, the Supreme Court has repeatedly defended litigants’ 
freedom to make arguments in court to which judges take offense.66 The 
Court has clarified that a judge’s desire to maintain order must not impede 
lawyers’ ability to argue for their clients.67 
 
 62 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 63 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
 64 Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 65 Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 66 See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965); 
In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962). These cases have been decided on due process or statutory 
grounds, but they reflect latent free speech values as well. 
 67 McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236. 
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Because courts are limited public fora, the government (usually in the 
person of the judge) may regulate the form and subject matter of speech in 
courtrooms, but may not discriminate based on viewpoint.68 Considering this, 
the simplest and most defensible way for a court to prevent politically 
provocative symbols from appearing on clothing in court is to prohibit any 
expressive symbol of any kind from being worn by lawyers or court 
personnel. A court could, for example, allow only expression permitted by 
the rules of court. Were this the practice in Las Vegas, prohibiting Black 
Lives Matter pins would be easily defensible against a First Amendment 
challenge. 
But once courts begin to allow some expressive clothing—a breast 
cancer awareness ribbon, or even a symbol of allegiance to an NFL team—
prohibiting a Black Lives Matter pin becomes more problematic as it appears 
to be a form of viewpoint discrimination. If it were to be justified, it would 
likely have to be on the grounds that the slogan “Black Lives Matter” is 
particularly controversial. 
There is some precedent for a controversial speech exception in limited 
public fora, but it is not clear to what extent the Supreme Court stands by 
this exception.69 As a starting point, the idea that controversial expression 
might be subject to special restrictions is inherently problematic because the 
First Amendment exists precisely to protect less popular speech, which is 
more likely to be considered controversial.70 If there is an exception for 
controversial speech, this possibility seems to be commonly invoked to 
restrict political activism by African-Americans, given that the case on point 
involved a restriction on the activities of the NAACP.71 Nevertheless, recent 
Supreme Court decisions that protected Christian speakers against viewpoint 
discrimination despite the controversial nature of their speech seem to 
undermine the controversial speech exception.72 In one of the Court’s more 
 
 68 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (permitting the 
exclusion of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from the 
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which solicits donations from federal employees, because the 
exclusion is “reasonable”). 
 70 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 
(1991) (summarizing the First Amendment’s strong protection of speech even when society finds the 
expression “offensive or disagreeable” (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))). 
 71 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813 (“We conclude that the Government does not violate the First 
Amendment when it limits participation in the CFC in order to minimize disruption to the federal 
workplace, to ensure the success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of political 
favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded groups.”). 
 72 See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07, 114–15 (2001) (reiterating 
strict viewpoint neutrality as the rule in limited public fora, without any evident exception for 
controversial viewpoints); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 899 (1995) 
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recent cases involving religious speech, the Court explicitly said in dicta that 
it would be specifically impermissible in a limited public forum for a 
government agency to exclude particular viewpoints about “racism.”73 This 
should cause judges to be cautious about imposing special restrictions on 
expression that seems controversial. 
In short, this is dicey territory for a court. In Las Vegas, Judge Herndon 
told Ms. Ballou that he thought the Black Lives Matter pin was an attack on 
the court.74 Offended as he might be, “[j]udges are supposed to be [people] 
of fortitude.”75 They must “guard against confusing offenses to their 
sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.”76 Moreover, 
lawyers, especially criminal defense attorneys, are supposed to raise issues 
that may make many people uncomfortable. They are not supposed to 
pretend that all is fine with our system of law enforcement if they do not 
believe that to be the case. 
Clearly, a balance must be struck. Perhaps lawyers may be granted more 
leeway in a hearing in front of a judge, but must be more circumspect when 
standing before a jury.77 Perhaps a judge would be on solid ground to 
disallow an especially large or visually distracting pin. But the Black Lives 
Matter pin that Erika Ballou wore was small and simple, with plain white 
letters on a black background. It attracts attention only because of its 
message, which is critical of police violence and possibly (in Judge 
Herndon’s view) of some judges. And there’s the rub. There is something 
especially unseemly about an elected judge who depends on police support 
in his campaigns singling out a defense attorney’s pin containing a message 
police dislike and ordering it removed. It may have happened in the 
courtroom, but the First Amendment still applies. Black Lives Matter is a 
deliberately provocative movement and message. But a judge should only 
 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s “holding amounts to a significant reformulation of our 
viewpoint discrimination precedents and will significantly expand access to limited-access forums,” and 
citing Cornelius as representing a different, earlier approach). 
 73 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of 
public discourse has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic 
of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to 
the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an 
atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or 
social viewpoint.”). 
 74 Ritter, supra note 1 (“The pin, the judge said, ‘is making a political statement, that, “I wear this 
in protest of how the court is treating minority defendants.”’”). 
 75 In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 
(1947)). 
 76 Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958)). 
 77 See Juhl & Ferrara, supra note 5 (noting that Ms. Ballou’s supervisor, Clark County Public 
Defender Phil Kohn, said no one from his office would wear the pin in front of a jury). 
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restrict its expression in a manner that does not violate the First 
Amendment’s strict prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in limited 
public fora. 
 
